

Abstracts of the Presentations at the NISA Conference

(update August 4, 2008)

Dr. Peter Becker, *The eyes and ears of the dragon - Chinese intelligence services - Organisation and activities*

Since the end of the “Cold War” there is a new scenario of threats which requires the attention of one of the eldest professions in the world – intelligence services.

This includes also Chinese intelligence services dating back almost 2500 years when Sun Ze wrote a detailed instruction on espionage. In imperial China mainly for domestic surveillance – after the revolution of 1911 the Republic of China and 1949 the People’s Republic of China expanded the deployment of intelligence services for gathering secret information abroad.

A world power till the 15th century China suffered a severe decline. The only power to keep the country together was the Chinese cultural nationalism or patriotism.

The current political system is of minor importance.

The system of control and surveillance was perfected in the PR China, but also in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Domestic oppression and observation of all kinds of opposition are the main duties which are complemented by secret information gathering abroad conducted by civilian and military intelligence services.

Target groups are mainly Chinese nationalists. Only recently foreigners became targets for Chinese intelligence services. Target areas are hightech economy, military and armaments industry, less politics. The opening of China since the beginning of the 80’s resulted in a very fast and surprising development, mainly in economy.

After years of isolation and suppression by foreign countries “the dragon awakes” and claims its appropriate place in the world. “The eyes and ears of the dragon” have an important share including the central control and surveillance to keep the “empire” with 1.3 billion people together..

The intelligence services are one pillar of power besides the Party and military. But it would be a mistake to put the blame on the “communist” system which is regarded as a “foreign dynasty”. The ideology is unknown to the Chinese people. “Zhong Guo”- translated as “kingdom of the middle” is the symbol and target for all Chinese around the world.

Stephan Blancke and Andreas Henneka, *North Korea: A Case Study in Western Intelligence Perception*

From the end of the Korean War in 1953 till today North Korea is one of the hot spots in the policy analysis and intelligence (mis)-perception. Ironically, the country was nearly not on the academic agenda till the end of the cold war and the fall of the iron curtain in 1991. The rapid decline of its economy, the conflict about its secret nuclear weapon program and its offensive operated missile program pitchforked North Korea in the center of international policy almost over night. Since then a serious lack of information troubles not only the policy makers in the United States and elsewhere but also the intelligence community. This is one of the main reasons that makes it so hard, to handle the North Korean issue in a reliable manner. Unlike the most analysts that identified the regime in Pyongyang as the man in charge for the present situation the authors are of the opinion, that fundamental failings in the intelligence perception as well as the ignorance of cultural and historical characteristics are important variables that have been ignored for too long in the interpretation of the conflict. In their paper

the authors would like to take a closer look at the intelligence perception of North Korea and the question, how the international community can be provided with more significant and valuable information.

Dr. Timothy C. Brown, *With The Valor of Ignorance. Fifty Years Clashing with Cultures and Improvising Intelligence*

In this lecture, the career of Dr. Timothy C. Brown will be narrated. To introduce the theme of cultural misperceptions and intelligence failures, a psychological war attack by witchcraft on Nicaraguan Contras in 1989 is narrated. This action resulted in a Marxist return to power.

The real story begins in Managua in 1956, when Brown first met communistst who forty years later were the keys to his research. As a Marine intelligence analyst, he was stationed in Thailand and the Philippines. He made his first counterinsurgency, counterintelligence, tactical and strategic intelligence experiences and discovered model counter-subversion teams in local villages. He also developed a database on hill tribes, with which he met sound reistance from entrenched analysts.

As a diplomat he subsequently moved to Vietnam, where he worked with CORDS program, modelled on Thai teams. Encounters with the Viet Cong induced him to reply with TOT based on agent reports. Trading with the enemy was one of his activities. He uncovered an infiltrator inside his Intelligence and Operations Center.

In 1987 he became “Mr. Contra”. He ran an unique State Department Office with oversight of CIA covert operations. He had to deal with the complexities of having fice different identity-based Contra armies. This was complicated by a badly divided US Congress, resistance by the Central American governments, UN and OAS involvement.

Parallel to these activities, Mr. Brown developed academic skills. He did doctorates on the history of the Contras and the Cold War. He discovered patterns found in Thailand, which he dubbed the ‘subversive business model’. This entailed the recruiting of communist contacts in Thailand, which he build into his own cell of former Marxist revolutionaries turned insider sources. Information obtained from this cell added to our knowledge of subversive organizations. Mr. Brown validated what was learned in Thailand and Vietnam and from research into the Contras. New ‘comrades’ also provided testimony and documents linking North Korea, North Vietnam and the Peoples Republic of China to Latin American revolutions.

Conclusion: subversions face similar problems so they develop similar structures, often from Cold War texts. Their major challenges include relations with external sponsors. Their operational limits are imposed by values of the populations they seek to represent. In sum, the causes and names change, but insurgencies and subversions are structurally much the same. Intelligence agencies face complex, multi-level cultural challenges both from outside and within. The biggest source of cultural misperceptions and consequent intelligence failures however can be unperceived internal biases.

Isabelle Duyvesteyn, *Counterinsurgency: politics, culture and misperception*

With Western armed forces at present militarily engaged in insurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is easy to forget that experts have repeatedly argued that a political solution is much more likely than a military victory. In order to achieve a political victory, reliable intelligence and cultural sensitivity have, in the past, been of paramount importance. Understanding the enemy, its cultural *habitus* and environment hold the key to successful counterinsurgency. This proposed paper will present an overview of the debate about counterinsurgency, its development and positions, and will elaborate on the conditions for

successful counterinsurgency. Examples will be derived from Asian counterinsurgency campaigns, such as the British handling of the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s and the more recent campaigns in Afghanistan.

Andreas Etges: *The Beginning of the "Golden Age" of the CIA? The 1953 coup against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran*

In March 2000 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright admitted before the Conference on American-Iranian Relations that "the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran's popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh." The 1953 coup "was clearly a setback for Iran's political development," Albright said, referring to the Shah's regime which "brutally repressed political dissent." That in her view helps explain "why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs." The successful coup against Mossadegh has often been described as the beginning of the "Golden Age" of the CIA, making Kermit Roosevelt, who led the CIA team in Iran, together with Edward Lansdale and others American Cold War heroes of nearly mythical proportions. Partly because of the alleged destruction or loss of important CIA documents it might be impossible to ever know the full story of the coup. There is still some debate, for example, about the exact role that certain clerical figures played. However, there is enough evidence to revise the official narrative and also the one given by Roosevelt in his book "Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran" (1979). The paper will highlight some of the problems and failures of Operation Ajax, including the initial failed coup attempt. Disregarding those failures, as was done in the past, led the CIA, politicians and others to draw the wrong conclusions from the coup in Iran, the paper will argue. In addition, it will be discussed to what extent economic interests and motives played a role for the Eisenhower administration's decision to support the coup, after initially resisting British requests. The 200-page official CIA history of the events in 1953, which was released a few years ago, focuses on American worries that Iran might become part of the Soviet sphere. Several National Security Council documents from 1952 and 1953 also suggest a primacy of Cold War concerns. That would mean, that "oil" was only of secondary importance.

Douglas Ford, *Strategic Culture and Intelligence Assessment: the Allied and Japanese experiences during the Pacific War*

The paper will illustrate how cultural factors influenced the effectiveness of Allied and Japanese intelligence efforts during the Second World War in the Asia-Pacific theaters.

Part 1: Strategic culture and intelligence assessment

In this section the paper will establish an analytical framework for determining how strategic culture affects the quality of an intelligence organization. The section will explain how strategic culture is largely the product of a nation's historical experiences. It will then illustrate how the situation within the US and British defense establishments was decisively more conducive for intelligence activities than was the case for the Japanese, mainly because the western powers had a more long-standing tradition of using intelligence to gauge the policies and military capabilities of their foreign rivals.

Part 2: Allied and Japanese intelligence during the Pacific War: a cross-cultural comparison

This section will constitute the main focus. It will argue that at the start of the Pacific War, neither the Allies nor the Japanese had an adequate knowledge of the challenges they faced, because the belligerents had minimal experience in fighting each other. Furthermore, both sides held a number of cultural and racial prejudices regarding their adversary, and this led them to make a number of miscalculations regarding each other's martial qualities. However, the British and Americans were in a more favorable position to familiarize themselves with the Japanese than vice versa. This was because the Allied defense establishments followed a progressive strategic culture which encouraged the use of intelligence to devise ways to improve the capabilities of their armed forces. Intelligence staffs were not hesitant to convey disconcerting facts regarding the enemy's war potential. Those responsible for directing the Allied war effort were all willing to admit the shortcomings of their forces and implement improvements. As a result, intelligence was used effectively to enable the Allies to develop the capacity to defeat their Japanese opponent.

Japan's strategic culture, on the other hand, scorned the value of intelligence. Social taboos discouraged the expression of doubts regarding the armed forces' ability to prevail. Military officials made only a minimal effort to gauge the war potential of their British and American opponents, since they preferred to base their calculations on the belief that the cultural superiority of the Japanese people would guarantee victory. Japan's leaders were thus averse to heeding any suggestions that their army and navy suffered weaknesses, and doggedly refused to improvise their plans even after they failed.

Effective intelligence enabled the Allies to marshal their industrial and military resources to formulate a successful war plan. At the same time, weak intelligence led Japan to embark on a venture for which it was ill-prepared, and misperceptions of its enemies played an important part in preventing it from properly reforming its methods. Contrasts in strategic culture were the main cause for the inequalities.

Kent Harrington, *Drugs, Thugs and Proliferation: An Examination of the Organization of Intelligence Centers and their Influence on Collection and Analysis in Asia*

The impact of September 11, 2001 on the American intelligence community has produced widespread agreement that the failure of collection and analysis to assemble and assess information contributed directly to the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC that have dramatically redirected American policies at home and abroad. As part of the post-mortem review of the performance of the intelligence community, both the well-know 9/11 Commission and an array of congressional oversight committees recommended the creation of an intelligence center to remedy the gaps and errors that led in part to the vulnerabilities of the American homeland and heightened the risks of attack. Neither the findings of these after-action studies or their recommendations were new, however, and the resulting changes adopted within the American intelligence community continue an organizational format and approach to dealing with terrorism that has been used on a variety of other problems by intelligence agencies for nearly 30 years. In Asia, in particular, intelligence centers have played a major role in dealing with counter-narcotics, anti-crime, and technology transfer issues as well as terrorism. Their organizational model—in the case of intelligence, the integration of collection and analytical disciplines, agencies, operations, and assessments to produce an interdisciplinary effort, including in the provision of close support to national security policymakers, defense and law enforcement officials—has also been used extensively elsewhere in the government such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in the US Treasury Department and in international organizations, including OECD and its member countries.

Notwithstanding the current cache of intelligence centers as the preferred format for addressing challenging, transnational problems, their history raises several issues concerning their impact on the intelligence process and product. While their successes in solving inter-agency problems and in combining talent and resources to address complex questions has often won deserved praise, the managerial and substantive effects of centers as an

organizational format for the collection and production of intelligence, including their drawbacks, remain largely unaddressed by either practitioners or students of the field. To be sure, the challenges faced by many centers—from terrorism to human trafficking—are significant when their issues not only cross traditional disciplinary and bureaucratic boundaries but also blur historic legal and political lines between domestic, foreign, and international security policy. But the complexities of the intelligence problems addressed by centers are only one challenge: as government components that exist in parallel with more traditional agency organizations which provide the training, career development, funding, infrastructure, and cultures for their personnel and operations, centers present management and substantive challenges that affect both the quality of their work as well as its substance.

This paper will discuss the work of centers in dealing with several intelligence issues in Asia, using specific cases—in counter-narcotics, counter-proliferation, and international organized crime—that illustrate both the strengths as well as the shortcomings that the intelligence center format presents. Because of its diversity as well as the complexity and global reach of many of Asia's economies, Asian governments as well as non-government organizations have been deeply involved in transnational issues that are the focus of contemporary, cutting edge intelligence efforts. Specifically, North Korea's growth as a leading source of narcotics and the international intelligence and law enforcement effort to stem that trade; the risks posed by dual use technology and materials in fostering proliferation as seen in the case of the *Yin He*, the Chinese cargo vessel alleged to carry precursors for chemical weapons that was boarded and inspected in 1993; and the role of China and Chinese organizations in a global, largely unchecked, and growing human trafficking trade all provide evidence of both the value and the limits of intelligence centers. In adding to examining the balance sheet presented by their history, the paper will offer several theoretical perspectives on the effects of intelligence centers on past as well as contemporary Asian issues, such as their effect on international cooperation on transnational threats. The paper will also address possible approaches to revising and reshaping the center concept in order to better integrate the work of intelligence centers with traditional intelligence organizations, policy making, defense, and law enforcement agencies.

Yoaz Hendel, *Israeli Intelligence Challenges from the Arab World*

In July 2006 two Israeli soldiers were kidnapped on the Lebanese border. The IDF responded with an all-out offensive against the Hezbollah organization. The kidnapping scenario from the Israeli border had been known to all the Israeli defense authorities for a long time, as was the possibility of there being an escalation in military tension.

Nevertheless, Israel entered the war with enormous gaps in the quality of intelligence and with inaccurate strategic evaluations.

Israel maintains an active and highly trained intelligence facility. Israel's abilities to gather information on countries and terror elements reduce the range of threats against it. Combating suicide terror declined substantially, principally due to the extensive development of these capabilities.

Why, then, did Israel's leaders fail to understand the Lebanese scenario? Why did Israel not achieve a crushing intelligence advantage over a quasi-military organization with limited resources, like Hezbollah? And how is it that a skilled and smoothly running intelligence system, which prepared well for an asymmetric confrontation with guerilla organizations was unable to translate the required expertise into military success.

The reason for this stems from the limited understanding of the West in general, and Israel in particular, of "the other side of the Middle Eastern hill". One of the known features of this

approach is the excessive use of “the mirror image”, in other words observing the enemy as a reflection of yourself – analyzing the wishes and intentions of the Islamic enemy based on what the assessor knows, according to what is known and logical to western culture, which it recognizes and represents. This means that the enemy is assessed based on the assessor’s subjective feeling, irrespective of the enemy’s culture and philosophy, in other words if the assessor is tired and worn down, the other side is too. If he is looking for quality of life, so is the other side. And if the assessor, or policy makers, wanted a peace treaty, this is obviously in the interest of the other side. This imagined symmetry exists due to the limited familiarity with the other side. The implications of the assessment obstacles are clearly reflected in Israel’s confrontation with Hezbollah.

The “Lebanese problem” did not feature highly in the IDF’s annual plans as it was convenient to live with the relative calm on Israel’s northern border after Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. And the Israeli intelligence treated the Lebanese sector accordingly.

Another point to be considered is the concern over an intelligence foul up, and exposing Israel’s intelligence gathering efforts, which could cause an unwanted escalation of the situation. As the other side’s intentions were not correctly assessed, and the basic assumption was that the intoxicating quiet should be maintained, Israel’s intelligence gathering abilities should be reduced, and the information that was obtained through greatly sensitive efforts should be kept in the utmost secrecy, known only to a select few. In so doing, Israel created a faulty intelligence cycle in the Lebanese context, partial definition of objectives, inadequate information gathering, inaccurate assessment and, ultimately, failures in disseminating the material.

Notwithstanding this, the Lebanon war generated considerable achievements in the intelligence sphere too. One of the few examples that can be discussed is the success in destroying the long range missile facility within one hour of the outbreak of war.

Kurt F. Jensen, First Canadian Special Wireless Group: Canadian Sigint operations against Japan in Australia: 1944-1945

Late in the war Canada was asked to assign a special SIGINT collection unit to be stationed in Australia. Two units (a Special Wireless unit and an Intelligence Group) were formed by July 1944 but it took until the following January before the group of nearly 340 men embarked as Number One Canadian Special Wireless Group (1SWG), accompanied by 51 trucks and tons of specialized equipment. Following a circuitous journey across the Pacific, 1SWG reached Brisbane in February.

1SWG became operational on April 30, 1945, near Darwin, taking over from the Australian Special Wireless Group. Japan surrendered a few months later but General Douglas MacArthur had 1SWG remain active and engaged in intercepting Japanese communications. Few details have emerged about the work of 1SWG, although it was, by all accounts proficient and well regarded, performing to a high standard and handling 1000-1200 messages per day. 1SWG monitored all Japanese traffic in the Darwin area, concentrating on Japanese naval communications and radio stations from the Dutch East Indies to the central Pacific, piecing together the Japanese communications network between Tokyo, Singapore, Rabaul, and the Pacific islands.

After Japan’s surrender, 1SWG disseminated communications from the Allies to Japanese units among the islands of the south Pacific, dispensing surrender instructions to isolated Japanese detachments in the southern Pacific. Members of the Intelligence Section, attached

to 1SWG, were dispersed to New Guinea, Timor, Philippines, and Japan to assist with peace negotiations, surrender ceremonies, and war crime investigations.

1SWG concluded its mission in Australia in October and returned to Canada in February, 1946. 1SWG was the only self-contained Canadian unit serving outside the country for SIGINT collection purposes.

The significance of 1SWG rests with its participation in an important inter-Allied intelligence organization, Australia's Central Bureau, made up of American, British, and Australian SIGINT units. The Canadian deployment also helped to foster and reinforce the inter-Allied exchanges of intelligence personnel, something which contributed to the intelligence partnership and cooperative approach which was then being formed.

The Canadian contribution was small but useful. Many of the details of its activities remain unknown. For long after the war, the existence of 1SWG remained secret including its existence being excised from official histories.

It was not until the mid-1990s that service in the Pacific War was acknowledged and medals awarded to members of 1SWG. Some details of 1SWG had already emerged by then.

Max Metselaar, Intelligence failures, misperceptions and the Tet Offensive. A cognitive coping theory on governmental unpreparedness

This paper differs in at least three respects from all earlier case-studies on the Tet Offensive. First, it is mainly focused on the way President Lyndon Johnson and Defense Minister Robert McNamara have responded to threat indications and warnings (I&Ws) which preceded the Tet Offensive. Second, the coping theory and methodology that has been applied for this case-study combines various disciplines and perspectives like social-psychological coping theory (especially insights on the use of avoidance and denial) with concepts, theories and methods derived from political science, political psychology, intelligence studies, disaster studies, early warning research, administrative science, management studies and communication sciences. Third, this case-study is quite specific in the conceptualization and measurement of key concepts like the "state of preparedness" of both decision-makers; "threat indications and warnings" and the degree wherein "appraisals," "dilemmas," "stress" and "coping" (especially avoidance and denial) of both decision-makers affected their preparedness and indirectly the preparedness of their military units in South Vietnam.

The case-study indicates that since half December 1967 Johnson started to pay more attention to the I&Ws. However, until at least two weeks before the start of the Tet offensive, Johnson and especially McNamara avoided to mention and discuss most of the more than 100 I&Ws. For different reasons and in different ways, both Johnson and McNamara almost consistently avoided and largely denied important parts of the I&Ws and the impending danger itself. Both Johnson and McNamara tended to minimize and even avoid warnings which pointed at the risk that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong were preparing a widespread offensive and a general people's uprising all over South Vietnam. Both political decision-makers largely avoided to pay attention to military vulnerabilities in South Vietnam as well as (paradoxically) *political* vulnerabilities and most likely consequences. Furthermore, they avoided to discuss the option to inform the public, the press and the Congress on the forthcoming enemy offensive. As a consequence, many political decisions and actions which could and should have been taken in order to implement timely additional protective counter-measures and mitigate the political and military risks and costs at home and abroad were not taken and/or delayed.

The need to maintain the conviction that the situation was still manageable and the need to keep their emotions and distress within functional limits forms a significant cause for Johnson's and McNamara's tendency to avoid and deny significant parts of the I&Ws, the

danger, and the complex and painful dilemmas they became confronted with. Johnson's and McNamara's avoidance and denial was contemplated and reinforced by their tendency to neglect and misunderstand the North Vietnamese culture. Despite contradicting signals that they could be wrong, the perceptions and appraisals of both decision-makers were dominated by strong Western/American culture-bound ways of thinking and acting. These strong cultural *biases* manifested itself in ethnocentrism, sustained feelings of superiority and can-do, combined with a mixture of underestimation and misunderstanding of Vietnam's culture. Again and again the far-reaching implications of strong Vietnamese nationalism and willingness to bring sacrifices and risk-taking; Hanoi's geo-political strategic thinking and acting, as well as the adversary's capabilities for radical changes in insurgency warfare, coordination and deception and the enemy's willingness in bringing sacrifices and taking risks were largely neglected or underestimated. In addition, Johnson and McNamara (and almost everyone in the military command and the intelligence community) largely overlooked that the Vietnamese culture and the planning of leaders like Ho Chi Minh and Giap was based on polychromic instead of monochromic thinking. Another major form of noise and bias was created by the almost automatic appraisal that most actions of the enemy were a response to American actions. These cognitive and cross-cultural biases continued to have a profound influence on Johnson's and McNamara's perceptions and coping behavior despite the fact that especially since half December 1967 both decision-makers became (more or less aware) that they were entrapped in a vicious cycle of wrong judgments and that things might be running out of control.

John Morrison, *British Intelligence Failures in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2000-2007.*

The post-Cold War era led to major changes in UK intelligence. The "peace dividend" resulted in significant cuts in intelligence collection in the 1990s, whereas the post-1997 New Labour government adopted an interventionist approach (Kosovo, Sierra Leone) and military support for US-led interventions (Afghanistan, Iraq). UK intelligence collection and intelligence changed from reactive (threat-responsive) to proactive (policy-responsive). However the UK Intelligence Community was poorly-based to make this transition, needing time to switch its efforts. In the aftermath of 9/11 resources were poured into the Security Service's mainly internal counter-terrorism efforts, but external intelligence fared less well. British forces in Afghanistan were intelligence-poor, depending largely on tactical ground-level collection. The decision to invade Iraq was policy-driven, with multiple intelligence failures, notably static intelligence assessments of Saddam Hussein's WMD capabilities and a determination by SIS to provide intelligence to support the UK Government's decision (already taken but publicly denied) to join the US's attack on Iraq. This led to a failure of the procedures to validate new HUMINT and a misrepresentation of the intelligence picture by the Prime Minister. The lessons learned were not new: indeed the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee carried out a series of studies in the '70s and '80s which identified the pitfalls into which the UK Intelligence Community blundered more than once in subsequent years. It remains unclear whether intelligence organisations, in the UK and elsewhere, can truly learn from their mistakes, or whether

failures of corporate memory will inevitably lead to their repetition.

Albert Schoneveld, *Rule of Law in Uruzgan - a matter of intelligence?*

The main thrust of Dr Schoneveld contribution will consist of observations from the field as experienced in Afghanistan in 2007 and early 2008. Working as a Rule of Law officer in the Uruzgan province, daily activities covered building up a network of local Rule of Law representatives, assessing their needs and identify projects to enhance the local Rule of Law operations. In addition, analysis of local (informal) justice systems was conducted as to find opportunities to connect them with the formal (national) system of rules and regulations. Obviously, all activities conducted in that respect were driven by intelligence, to ensure that the appropriate levels and representatives were dealt with and to avoid disturbance of local power structures.

In his contribution Dr Schoneveld will address some practical problems encountered in international missions where people work in an environment they are basically unfamiliar with. True, intelligence gathered by the appropriate intel bodies provides guidance for day to day business. However, the local power play is volatile, key players come and go, hence the operational setting is in a constant flux. How to cope with new so-called counterparts? Notably if the intel is inadequate to assess their real stance toward improvement of conditions? Green light from governmental circles in Kabul is convenient, but is it trustworthy? In similar vein, the use of informants should be considered opportune only if the intel on these very information sources is sufficient and reliable. But what if it does not qualify in that sense? In addition, the use of local interpreters may pose a security risk as their interest may only partly coincide with those of the mission.

In assessment, Dr Schoneveld will formulate a number of challenges for current and future missions as to their effectiveness and efficacy.

Georgina Sinclair, *'Political Policing' during the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1957*

This paper considers the development of police intelligence systems during the Malayan Emergency (1948-60), the notion of 'political policing' and questions the limits of the lessons learnt from earlier colonial experiences (e.g. Palestine 1936-48).

With a declaration of a state of emergency in June 1948, a poorly equipped and under-staffed Malayan police force were provided with a draconian range of legislative and security measures to defeat the communist insurgents. The conflict that ensued for over a decade had the hallmark of a colonial war though was no doubt mislabeled 'emergency'. Britain sank huge resources into the counter-insurgency campaign that ensued set against the backdrop of a developing Cold War in Southeast Asia. This included the emergence of new police intelligence systems and covert counter-insurgency units.

The Malayan Security Service (MSS) was set up in 1939 and staffed with police officers from the Malayan and Singapore police forces. Within the broader context of the British Empire, the notion of a Special Branch emerged comparatively late in the day as an alternative mechanism of intelligence gathering, previously the domain of CID. The Japanese invasion of Malaya during the Second World War decimated the ranks of the MSS and whilst it became

operational once more in 1945, evidence points to it having underestimated the level of communist activity which resulted in a declaration of a state of emergency in 1948. The MSS was disbanded in August 1948 and replaced with the Malayan and Singapore Special Branches. The Malayan Special Branch became the main intelligence agency to provide intelligence and counterintelligence on the Communist Party of Malaya and the Malayan National Liberation Army. It was responsible during this period for both political and security intelligence. In parallel came the emergence of police counter-insurgency units (jungle squads). The police intelligence systems were partly founded on previous colonial experiences and staffed by an influx of officers from the disbanded Palestine Police (1948). Yet their 'experiences' may have been weighted to a greater extent on *security* rather than *political* measures.

Allard Wagemaker, *Cultural intelligence and Dutch civil-military operations in northern Afghanistan*

Cultural awareness is a term to describe an understanding of local culture. In recent years, the Western military have become increasingly conscious of the importance of cultural awareness in carrying out their military missions. For the Dutch armed forces, cultural awareness plays increasingly an important role, ever since they have become involved in peace operations in various parts of the world. These operations are, basically, policing operations, and policing is to a large extent a matter of communication. It is not a simple matter of locating and opposing an enemy, instead the missions are involved in keeping people from initiating or supporting anti-government actions. To do so, the military need to talk with people; they need communication at a low-tech and real-time level with the people to disseminate and gather information.

An understanding of local networks is essential in ISAF's transition operations in northern Afghanistan. The Afghan society is organized along two lines: the state and its apparatus, and next to that the informal networks that are mostly based on family links and local relationships (either ethnic, religious, political, or otherwise). Informal networks hardly ever reach the state level in Afghanistan. During the last 25 years of internecine wars, local relationships proved to be the best possible protection for the individual and his family. Consequently, one of the main challenges nowadays in Afghanistan, as faced by the national government and the international community, is to strengthen the state structure and to redirect the often inward-looking local networks towards full participation in the state-building process of Afghanistan. To date, however, military and NGO's working in Afghanistan and especially in isolated provinces will mainly be confronted, sometimes literally, by local networks that are naturally inclined to protect their own interests, rather than those of the state. Long experience has taught them that the state has little to offer in a positive sense. Who can tell whether the present regime with its Western backing will last? "Keep some weapons for rainy days", is often their motto. In other words, loyalty is mostly directed downwards (protecting the interests of one's own group), instead of upwards ('God, Queen and Country').

The Dutch ISAF-PRT in Baghlan, is acutely aware of their position. Being a small force in a large province, they support and assist the local government. Yet they realize that local government itself is operating within a complex web of relationships and to a large extent the officials are dependent on local networks and power-holders that base their position on their ethnic, social, religious, historical, or, even more importantly at present, their financial role in the province. For the Dutch PRT, lending support to local government has sometimes proved difficult because of these external influences that are, more often than not, very hard to

understand, and difficult to deal with. The PRT faces a dilemma: they cannot negotiate openly with influential local powerbrokers but they have to stabilize the situation. My article is about the role of cultural intelligence in the Dutch PRT-operations in the Baghlan province. It focuses on the way of assembling this kind of information, the problem of interpreting it (i.e. make intelligence of it) and how to effectively use it.

Conference information: www.nisa-intelligence.nl